In order to increase access to medical services, expanding coverage has long been the preferred solution of policy makers and advocates alike. The calculus appeared straightforward: provide individuals with insurance, and they will be able to see a provider when needed. However, this line of thinking overlooks a crucial intermediary step: provider networks. As provider networks offered by health insurers link available medical services to insurance coverage, their breadth mediates access to health care. Yet the regulation of provider networks is technically, logistically, and normatively complex. What does network regulation currently look like and what should it look like in the future? We take inventory of the ways private and public entities regulate provider networks. Variation across insurance programs and products is truly remarkable, not grounded in empirical justification, and at times inherently absurd. We argue that regulators should be pragmatic and focus on plausible policy levers. These include assuring network accuracy, transparency for consumers, and consumer protections from grievous inadequacies. Ultimately, government regulation provides an important foundation for ensuring minimum levels of access and providing consumers with meaningful information. Yet, information is only truly empowering if consumers can exercise at least some choice in balancing costs, access, and quality.
and long-term through its insurance marketplaces and Medicaid (Haeder 2012) . Of course, similar propositions underlay previous expansions of Medicaid, Medicare, and the creation of the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Weimer 2015a, 2015b) . Even after passage of the ACA, the major focus of the political debate has been on coverage expansions (or reductions) via the insurance marketplaces and Medicaid (Rocco and Haeder 2018) . With the emergent issue of Medicaid work requirements, backdoor coverage reductions via administrative burdens have taken over much of the spotlight (Herd and Moynihan 2018) .
Yet an exclusive focus on the extent of coverage misses a crucial intermediary step: provider networks offered by insurance companies. Nominally comprehensive coverage provisions overstate the practical value of health insurance when desired providers are not in the network, or they are too far away to be conveniently accessed. Such restrictions first attracted scholarly and media focus in the wake of the managed care revolution of the 1990s (White 1999) . The implementation of the ACA's insurance marketplaces, already marred in partisan quarrels, brought renewed attention to the topic, as well as ample partisan finger-pointing (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2015; Mukamel 2015a, 2015b; Polsky and Weiner 2015) . Of particular interest has been the relatively small size of many of these networks, and the frequent exclusion of prominent providers (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2015a) . The issue of whether and how insurers can and should restrict consumer choice extends beyond the ACA to programs like Medicare Advantage and employer-sponsored insurance Hall and Frostin 2016) .
Narrowing provider networks has been shown to serve as one of the few remaining legal options for insurers to contain costs (Dafny et al. 2017; Polsky, Cidav, and Swanson 2016) . The underlying mechanism is simple: insurers offer providers higher volume in return for lower prices (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2015b) . Naturally, providers prefer both higher volume and higher reimbursements as evidenced by the increasing vertical and horizontal integration of providers nationwide (Capps, Dranove, and Ody 2018) . This trend raises concerns about the long-term sustainability of the price-reducing effects of narrower networks. But for now, networks are narrowing, and consumers are benefiting from reduced premiums.
This cost control approach, however, comes with its own set of trade-offs. By definition, narrower networks include fewer providers. Moreover, providers may be less geographically decentralized, leading to increased travel times for some consumers. Reduction of access in these ways may have particularly negative health outcome effects for vulnerable populations (Syed, Gerber, and Sharp 2013) . A further effect of narrowing networks has recently featured prominently in both the popular media and scholarly writing: so-called surprise bills (Cooper and Morton 2016; Garmon and Chartock 2016; Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2019) . They usually occur in circumstances in which consumers seek care at an in-network hospital but are, mostly unknowingly, serviced by an out-of-network provider. To make things worse, this often happens for costly services like emergency care or anesthesia, whose providers often deliberately refuse to enter into network contracts as a business strategy (Cooper and Morton 2016; Garmon and Chartock 2016) .
Both difficulty in accessing care and surprise bills after receiving it give reason for government regulation to protect consumers. What does network regulation currently look like, and what should it look like in the future? We first highlight the multidimensionality of network regulation and oversight involving issues of accuracy, adequacy, monitoring, and quality. To illustrate the remarkable and empirically unfounded variation across insurance programs and products, as well as geographic and temporal disparities, we also inventory some of the ways private entities and state and federal governments regulate provider networks. Although we raise many questions that can only be answered through extensive dialogue among all stakeholders involved, we argue that change is necessary to protect both consumers and providers, and to ensure that empowered consumers are able to make well-informed choices and receive adequate and affordable care.
The Multidimensionality of Network Regulation

Accuracy: The Prerequisite
Guaranteeing accurate provider network data is a crucial, often neglected, step in the process of regulating provider networks (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2016) . At a minimum, accuracy entails knowing what providers are in the network, their specializations, and their locations. Ideally consumers should, but they currently do not, know whether providers are contracted to be part of a network for their entire coverage period. With hundreds of providers dropping from provider networks during coverage periods, this situation has been recognized by one regulator, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), as so problematic that it permits special enrollment periods for affected consumers in Medicare Advantage plans (Jaffe 2016) . However, the CMS approach is not common and most consumers are left without a remedy.
Ideally, consumers should have access to information beyond what providers are theoretically in a network. They should know whether a provider is actively practicing the respective specialty, accepts new patients, and if so, how many. They would want to know whether appointments can be made when needed, likely wait times, and the quality of care and services provided. Issues of accuracy become even murkier when it comes to provider groups and hospital-based services. In both cases, some, but not all, providers in a location may be part of a network, often leaving befuddled consumers to deal with surprise balance bills (Garmon and Chartock 2016) .
Unfortunately, as recent analyses illustrate, network accuracy is rather dismal even in terms of the most basic expectations (GAO 2015; Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2016) . Aware of these problems, regulators have increasingly moved to require more frequent updating of provider directories, particularly in the wake of the implementation of the ACA (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2015) . Some regulators, for example CMS, also require that insurers indicate whether providers are accepting new patients (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2016) . Some states have also moved to address the issue of surprise medical bills through restrictions on both insurers and providers (Garmon and Chartock 2016) .
Yet regulators, with few exceptions, rarely actively monitor compliance with these requirements, often limiting attention to triggering events like new market entries (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2016) . They have largely relied on consumer complaints to make up for this deficiency, but rarely track and analyze complaints systematically (MACPAC 2015; Wishner and Marks 2017) . This failure is not surprising as in many cases regulators rely on affirmations by insurers and, moreover, generally lack the staff and resources required for appropriate monitoring and oversight (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2016) .
Adequacy: Or When Is Enough Enough?
One of the major difficulties in determining the adequacy of networks is that stakeholders have failed to reach an agreement about the interpretation of the concept itself. Most observers can probably agree that for provider networks to be adequate, consumers should be able to access appropriate providers, in a timely manner, and without expending excessive resources to do so. However, the practical application becomes murky quickly. Not surprisingly, regulators and stakeholders have failed to reach a consensus about how to assess adequacy in practice: currently-used quantitative standards vary considerably even within the same insurance program.
Medicaid managed care illustrates this variability. A survey of state programs found significant discrepancies in standards (Murrin 2014) . These included wait times for routine appointments varying from 10 to 60 days and travel distances varying from 15 to 60 miles. Moreover, as our review below indicates, there is little research to provide empirical justifications.
In view of these ubiquitous challenges, it is not surprising that many private and public regulators have been loath to set strict quantitative standards. Instead, they have preferred qualitative terms such as "adequate, "reasonable," and "sufficient" (GAO 2015; Hall and Brandt 2017) . In many cases the definition of adequacy, as well as of monitoring and compliance, has been devolved to the insurers. Recent developments suggest renewed interest in stricter, quantitative standards. States as diverse as Arkansas and California have addressed time and distance standards and wait times, respectively (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2015) . The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) also recently updated its network model law, which now contains mentions of provider-to-enrollee ratios and maximum wait times. However, the Trump Administration has bucked this trend and retreated from the more aggressive approach pursued in the latter years of the Obama Administration (CMS 2017).
Current quantitative standards are usually based on a small number of criteria (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2015c) . For example, some regulators prescribe certain provider-to-enrollee ratios or maximums for the allowable distance or travel time from either the consumer's home or workplace to the nearest provider (Hall and Ginsburg 2017) . At times, these only apply to certain specialties (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2016) . Some regulators allow for adaptations based on terrain or rurality (GAO 2015) . A small number of others set limits on wait times for appointments or even in-office wait times (Hall and Ginsburg 2017) . In yet rarer cases, regulators have also imposed minimum hours of operation and required the availability of translators (Hall and Ginsburg 2017) .
Quantitative ratios, however, have their own flaws. Provider-to-enrollee ratios were found by the Department of Defense to have little relationship to access (GAO 2000) . The vast diversity of ratios used by regulators indicates a lack of compelling empirical evidence (Brodsky, Smith, and Rodin 2015) . The most fundamental problem, however, is that regulators only assess provider-to-enrollee ratios for individual programs and not comprehensively. Providers could be listed in hundreds of insurance products simultaneously, so the ratio of enrollees to providers from one plan tells little about their availability.
To make matters worse, different insurance products are regulated by wholly different regulators, potentially at different levels of government. In California, for example, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) are regulated by the Department of Managed Care; preferred provider organizations (PPOs) are regulated by the Department of Insurance; ACA marketplace plans are regulated by both as well as Covered California and CMS; Medicaid is regulated by the California Department of Health Care Services as well as CMS; and Medicare Advantage is regulated by CMS only. 1 Moreover, network enrollment is dynamic and at times hard to predict, making it inherently challenging to compute these metrics appropriately on a timely basis. Travel and distance standards also vary dramatically (Brodsky, Smith, and Rodin 2015) . Arguably, travel and distance standards may also be counterproductive for geographically concentrated providers like pediatric specialists and tertiary and quaternary care providers (McAndrew and Hernández-Cancio 2014). The same holds for highly integrated networks like Kaiser Permanente (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2015a) .
These shortcomings are further exacerbated because health care systems are undergoing constant change and innovation. Telemedicine services (Ahn, Corlette, and Lucia 2016) and the liberalization of the regulations governing physician extenders (Xue et al. 2016 ) raise questions about whether traditional standards are still appropriate. Absent a sound and widely accepted conceptual foundation, increasing complexity risks an increasing cascade of ever more prescriptive regulatory actions with the concomitant requirement to monitor and oversee them. Ultimately, an agreement on what can be considered grievous inadequacies or clearly unacceptable inadequacies, that is, a regulatory floor, may be more obtainable. But even that may be challenging as it requires some calibration based on the vulnerability of consumers as well as the type of provider involved. For example, we should be hesitant to require Medicaid beneficiaries to travel 30 miles to see a pediatrician but it may be desirable for a Medicare Advantage beneficiary to travel 60 miles to see a high-quality coronary 1. A cursory analysis by the authors of provider network data provided by Vericred under contract with the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation further illustrates this point. Including the vast majority of networks for ACA and Medicare Advantage plans nationwide, the data indicate that of the about 2.6 million providers in the data set, about 110,000 are part of more than 100 diverse "networks" and about 680,000 are part of more than 50 "networks." It is also worth noting that insurers often use the same "network" for multiple products (e.g., different types of HMO products with different out-of-pocket structures, products sold on insurance marketplaces and to commercial customers, or small and large group products). This, of course, renders the use of provider-to-enrollee ratios in individual products even more absurd. artery bypass graft (CABG) surgeon. And of course, floors may very quickly degenerate into ceilings.
Quality: The Ultimate Goal?
We were unable to locate any specific network regulation approaches that include quality measures. Yet, as pay-for-performance schemes expand and measurement evolves, new questions about the quality of providers become salient. Empirically, the relationship between quality and the narrowing of networks is mixed. For example, one article found no negative effect for hospitals in California ACA marketplaces (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2015a) while another one found negative effects for cancer treatment (Yasaitis, Bekelman, and Polsky 2017) . A recent study of Medicare Advantage in California found no negative effects in large metropolitan areas combined with overwhelming access restrictions in rural parts of the state (Haeder 2019) .
The inclusion of quality standards inherently clashes with some of the most prominent network regulations in place, including provider ratios, maximum appointment wait times, and maximum time and distance restrictions. One could imagine scenarios in which both insurers and consumers would be better off if the latter waited longer and drove farther to see a provider of higher quality instead of seeking care from a low-quality provider next door on the same day. Some employers, including Santa Barbara County in California (Terhune 2017 ) and Lowe's (Tomsic 2016) , have opted for the priority of quality over convenience. Similarly, some consumers are willing to trade better quality for longer distances .
Naturally, the inclusion of quality measures in network regulation raises a series of common problems with regard to measuring provider quality (Gormley and Weimer 1999; Mukamel, Haeder, and Weimer 2014) as well as the adequacy issues discussed above. Indeed, for certain specialties like neonatal intensive care, appropriate and valid quality measures may be truly unobtainable (Profit et al. 2007 ). Yet, particularly with the recent emergence of state-based all-payer databases, an argument can be made that insurers should be encouraged to exclude lower quality providers when possible, or at least deploy incentives or information to steer consumers to higher quality care. While there are concerns about cream skimming (Green and Wintfeld 1995; Wadhera and Bhatt 2017) , CABG and other health report cards, on average, appear to have improved overall levels of care (Fung et al. 2008; Mukamel, Haeder, and Weimer 2014; Peterson et al. 1998 ). Pathways to improvement could include changes in provider behavior (Gormley and Weimer 1999) , exclusion of low-performers from managed care panels (Mukamel et al. 2002) , or patient choice (Mukamel et al. 2004 ). However, every discussion of quality and value naturally raises the question about what floors and what degrees of inequality we, as a society, are willing to accept for each type of coverage.
Current Approaches to Network Regulations and Oversight
How do some of the current regulatory approaches score in terms of accuracy, adequacy, monitoring, and quality? Table 1 provides an overview of a number of systems for regulating networks, including those for Medicare Advantage, the 1996 and 2015 version of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Law 74, the Department of Defense TRICARE program, Covered California, the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) accreditation, and the ACA federal marketplaces for 2017 and 2018. We once more note that the regulation of provider networks has shown a remarkable lack of consistency.
Historically, regulators seem to have shown little concern about network accuracy. For example, the 1996 NAIC model law fails to make any recommendations about it. Over time, various studies have brought the issue to regulators' attention, for example, in California (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2016) . However, rules about accuracy are generally qualitative in nature, although recently, time frames for required updates of information have been included (Giovannelli, Lucia, and Corlette 2016) .
Similarly, regulators have generally preferred qualitative approaches to regulating network adequacy, relying on phrases like "sufficient," "reasonable," and "timely" (see table 1 ). More recently, federal regulators have moved strongly toward quantitative standards across programs ranging from TRICARE (GAO 2011 (GAO , 2015 to Medicare Advantage (Haeder 2019) . Some states, like California, have followed suit (Covered California 2017; Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel 2015b ). Yet the Trump Administration's reversal shows a lack of consensus on a more quantitative approach. Moreover, compliance monitoring is not always assigned to a public regulator such as a state's department of insurance, department of health services, or insurance commissioner. For instance, in the case of NCQA regulations, health plans are encouraged to develop their own standards. As aforementioned, at times triggering events like new market entries may be the sole circumstances in which regulators become actively involved in oversight activities. Finally, as the last column in table 1 shows, none of the regulatory systems appear to address the quality of providers.
Moving Forward with Network Regulation: Setting Floors and Empowering Consumers
Provider networks crucially link insurance coverage to access to medical services (Haeder, Weimer, and Mukamel forthcoming) . In the current US combination of market and government insurance, narrower networks have helped consumers save on premiums. Unfortunately, the problems of access and surprise bills call for some regulation but the regulation of provider networks is technically, logistically, and normatively complicated. Some advocates would argue this knotty problem should be addressed by eliminating the need for narrow networks, through price controls and allpayer regulation or even Medicare-for-All. But in the absence of an Alexander, the US health care system seems unlikely to slice through the Gordian knot. Perhaps further outrage about surprise billing may bring some movement on the issue, but the likelihood of transformational change appears to us to be slim.
Experience also does not suggest that regulators have the resources and expertise to confront these challenges effectively. Current efforts have appeared erratic and ungrounded in empirical evidence. As we have indicated above, some of them offer a mirage of consumer protections while bordering on absurdity. We believe that the discussion about the future of networks should move to a constructive conversation about what is achievable, including the trade-offs among costs, network breadth, and potentially quality. We also believe that consumers should be empowered to make meaningful choices about trade-offs, and evaluate for themselves which of these trade-offs they are willing to make based on their personal preferences. Moving forward we thus see the main role for government regulators as threefold.
First, accuracy of information is important for both meaningful consumer choice and effective government regulation. Accuracy depends on actions by insurers and providers as well as by regulators. Yet regulators can address some major sources of inaccuracy and the resulting consumer confusion. For example, regulators should synchronize enrollment periods among all sources of coverage while requiring that providers listed as innetwork during open enrollment remain so for the entirety of the coverage period. Regulators could also require insurers to verify their networks against all-payer databases to assure that providers included in their networks are actively practicing. With rampant inaccuracies evident in the current system, meaningful incentives and sanctions should be made available to regulators, particularly with regard to the accuracy of information provided to consumers.
Second, a regulatory approach that focuses on providing consumers with information can be more enforceable and flexible than efforts to set quantitative standards Mukamel, Haeder, and Weimer 2014) . Information about how well insurers have fared in terms of accuracy, access, and quality could be developed in various ways and made available to consumers and consumer advocates. All-payer databases, consumer surveys, secret shopper surveys, and geo-mapping offer a wide array of information that should be harvested by regulators. Consumers have different preferences and should be empowered to make trade-offs they perceive as best in terms of their own values.
Third, consumers should have access to providers of all accepted specialties within the confines of their networks. Vulnerable populations such as seniors, the poor, and non-native English-language speakers are most likely to face significant harms if plans do not have providers within a reasonable travel distance and do not provide adequate transportation and compensation for necessary costs such as accommodations. As we discuss above, challenges in setting floors abound, particularly when using quantitative approaches like ratios. Given these limitations, regulators and consumers may be well-served by generally relying on qualitative standards while providing resources to assist consumers with navigating the health care system as well as filing complaints. California, for example, has long funded its Office of the Patient Advocate as well as certified application assistors to play this role. Quantitative travel distance measures can work as supplements when appropriate.
In the case of excessive wait times, regulators should ensure that consumers unable to access appropriate providers within the boundaries of their plans be allowed to utilize outside providers without penalty. A waittime standard can be set as the basis for exceptions to the network as they occur, rather than a criterion for the network overall. Moreover, regulators should require that all services rendered at in-network hospitals be considered in-network. This could be achieved through a variety of mechanisms focused on provider regulation including forced bundling of hospital services, forced arbitration, or price setting (Adler et al. 2019) . Analogously, network contracts should generally apply to entire medical groups and not individual providers.
We believe that the issue of narrowing provider networks is unlikely to diminish in importance in the near future. The big health care battles may be fought over the repeal of the ACA, Medicare-for-All, or Medicaid work requirements. Yet, the crucial link between insurance coverage and access to health care services affects all Americans on a daily basis, with potentially tremendous health and financial consequences. Regulators, policy makers, and scholars would be well served not to brush aside network regulation as a minor technical detail in the battles over coverage expansions, but rather treat it as a crucial pathway to guaranteeing consumers meaningful access to crucial health care services. 
